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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the past decades, the increased level of globalisation has resulted in nations 
working together on various platforms. From Europe to Asia, states started cooperating through 
border-transcending organisations, deepening cooperation between countries within specific regions. 
Arguably the best-known example of such a regional organisation is the European Union (EU). 
Previously known as the European Coal and Steel Community, the organisation continuously evolved 
over the course of its existence, culminating in the organisation that is today known as the EU. With 
its current composition of twenty-eight member states – ignoring the British initiative to withdraw – 
the EU as an organisation is heralded as a pioneer of regional integration. Boening et al. (2008) 
referred to the EU as the “undisputed leader of regional integration,” as well as proclaiming that the 
EU offers a useful model of regional integration for other organisations. It is therefore not surprising 
that the EU model has indeed been used as an inspiration, if not blatantly imitated elsewhere in the 
world. The most recent regional organisation based on a similar framework as the EU is the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EaEU). On the first of January 2015, this new regional organisation was officially 
established by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The organisation, which was proudly presented as a 
powerful economic bloc, seemed to be the next big step in the process of Eurasian integration. 
Structure-wise the EaEU shares many similarities with its European counterpart.  
 Even before its official launch the EaEU had been the subject of fiery debates. Various labels 
were given to the EaEU, ranging from truly being an economic regional integration project, to being 
branded as an attempt to fulfil neo-imperialistic dreams of Russia. Some statements went as far as to 
say that Eurasian integration is nothing more than an attempt to recreate the defunct Soviet system. 
Initial announcements of establishing a ‘Eurasian Union’ made by Russian president Putin were 
quickly met with opposition. Hillary Clinton (2012), who served as Secretary of State of the United 
States at that time, criticised the idea of such an initiative because she saw it as an effort to “re-
Sovietise” the region. Economist Anders Åslund (2016) shares this negative and somewhat cynical 
perspective, believing that the EaEU does little more than reinforcing obsolete Soviet standards, and 
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furthermore believes the organisation provides no actual economic benefits for its participants. 
Timofei Bordachev (2015), the director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International 
Studies at the National Research University, denies claims of the EaEU not bringing economic 
benefits. He further believes that Russia sharing its sovereignty with other members is a sign that 
contradicts accusations of neo-imperialistic ambitions. Putin (2011) stressed in his oft-cited article 
introducing the Union that the project would be economic in nature and would respect the sovereignty 
of those willing to join, thus debunking claims of imperialistic ambitions. The other two founding 
members, Kazakhstan and Belarus, demanded that the project should contain the word ‘economic’, to 
ensure the nature of the organisation was clear (Dragneva 2016: 6).  
 To make educated statements about the EaEU and its ambitions, one must first understand the 
process of regional integration. In the academic debate the actual focus on how the Union is 
progressing with its integration is often ignored, or perhaps overlooked however. The EU, which 
served as an example for the EaEU framework, has been thoroughly subjected to multiple theories of 
regional integration. These have helped explaining how the integration process of the EU has 
progressed over the years. Such theories provided different perspectives and insights on why the EU 
and its member states acted the way they did in certain pivotal situations. The two main streams of 
regional integration theory were known as functionalism, which was later altered to neo-functionalism, 
and intergovernmentalism, which was followed up by liberal intergovernmentalism. To avoid 
confusion, it should be noted that despite its name liberal intergovernmentalism has no specific 
connection to liberal democracies or other liberal types of regimes. The theory is in fact considered to 
be part of the realist stream of thought. Both theories have been used extensively to gain a better 
understanding of the integration process experienced by the EU. The popularity of the theories led 
them to be applied to other regional organisations too, for example the African Union (Eriksson & 
Gelot 2013; Touray 2016) and post-Soviet integration projects, which are discussed later. This thesis is 
built on the assumption that liberal intergovernmentalism could be a useful tool for gaining a better 
understanding of the motivations of the EaEU founding members to create the Union. Therefore, the 
primary goal of this thesis is to show how liberal intergovernmentalism can help explain why Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan formed the EaEU.   
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When seeking general literature on the EaEU one mostly finds debates concerning the nature 
of the project. Pre-existing literature also heavily focuses on the uncertain future of the Union, 
resulting in an abundance of literature making predictions of what will happen in the years to come. 
Examples of such literature include Adomeit (2012), who described the notion of a Eurasian Union as 
a ‘tug-o-war’ between Russia and the EU for control over the shared neighbourhood. Bordachev 
(2015) on the other hand sees the EaEU as an ample opportunity for economic gain in Central-Asia. 
Aside from these general predictions, literature devoted to deeper scientific analysis has been 
produced over the past few years. Notable examples include Kembayev (2016), who wrote an 
elaborate analysis on the functioning of the Eurasian Commission (EC). Another example of 
comprehensive analysis is an economic report written by Kubayeva (2015), who discussed the 
economic impact of the integration project on its member states.  
 Despite there being a considerable amount of resources on the mentioned theories of regional 
integration, research on the EaEU related to the liberal intergovernmentalist theory remains marginal. 
Obydenkova (2011) wrote a study that is somewhat comparable to this thesis. In her work, she argues 
that theories of regional integration used for the EU could indeed prove to be useful tools for analysing 
Eurasian integration as well. The scope of her research was aimed at the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) however, a project preceding the EaEU. Furthermore, Obydenkova makes 
the proposition that both neo-functionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism would be suitable 
theories for the region, though focuses mostly on neo-functionalism while giving 
intergovernmentalism a minor role. This means there is still room left for further research. Similarly, 
an article written by Roberts and Moshes (2015) goes deeper into the integration process of the EaEU 
by using the neo-functionalist theory, arguing this theory is an obvious choice as an analytical 
framework for the region while at the same time acknowledging its flaws. Intergovernmentalism on 
the other hand is only mentioned twice throughout their work. Karliuk (2015) touches upon the 
importance of intergovernmentalist elements within the EaEU, but restricts himself to a pragmatic 
approach when analysing the roles of EaEU institutions. Furthermore, he does not attempt to link the 
institutions or the EaEU and its member states to the actual theoretical framework, nor using the 
liberal variant of intergovernmentalism.  
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 Fissolo (2016) presents a comparative study between the EU and the EaEU. This study also 
acknowledges the limits of neo-functionalism as an integration theory, as well as the necessity for a 
possible alternative theory to fully understand the Eurasian integration process. Fissolo continues to 
present us with shallow conclusions at best however, while further mentioning neo-realism instead of 
(liberal) intergovernmentalism as a suitable alternative for neo-functionalism. Vicari (2016) wrote an 
article comparable to Fissolo, in which she mentions similarities between the EU and the EaEU as 
well as discussing functional spill-over; this once again is an element of neo-functionalism. Much like 
Fissolo, she refrains from making in-depth analyses of regional integration. Thus, when looking at 
previous works, numerous studies advocate using neo-functionalism for Eurasian integration, whereas 
liberal intergovernmentalism is largely side-lined as a suitable theory. This thesis attempts to remedy 
this gap in the literature by demonstrating that liberal intergovernmentalism can also be applied to gain 
a better understanding of Eurasian integration and why members of the EaEU put their efforts into it.  
 Filling this gap in the literature could prove to be useful in the case of the EaEU. It is a 
relatively young organisation and its true intentions are yet to be fully uncovered. The Union could 
evolve into a partner for the EU, or a rival competing for regional influence not only in Europe, but 
also in Asia and perhaps the Middle-East. Moreover, the EaEU achieved something which other 
Eurasian projects failed to do: making actual progress in terms of integration. How this was done is 
discussed in later chapters. These successes, marginal as they may be, indicate it is too early to 
disregard the EaEU as another failed attempt of post-Soviet integration. Additionally, the re-ignition 
of geopolitics as an important part of foreign policy in both Western Europe and Russia emphasise the 
role of the EaEU. Using liberal intergovernmentalism to explore the regional integration process in 
Eurasia adds depth to both understanding the founding members of the EaEU and the choices they 
make, as well as adding information to the ongoing debates on theories of regional integration. Using 
elements of liberal intergovernmentalism on the EaEU member states could either support or debunk 
the use of the theory, as well as exploring its usefulness outside of the EU. This could lead to the 
formation of new perspectives on existing theories as well as renewed interest in the debate on classic 
theories of regional integration.  
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 This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter introduces the EaEU and its 
founding members. The chapter discusses the origin of the organisation, its organisational structure, 
and provides information on Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus to create an image of how the countries 
function. The second chapter presents the liberal intergovernmentalist framework used for this thesis. 
Besides background information on the theories of regional integration, this chapter also gives an 
elaborate justification on why liberal intergovernmentalism was chosen instead of neo-functionalism. 
Moreover, the chapter shows how the framework is operationalised for this research. Chapters three 
and four present the case of the EaEU through the scope of the framework, and show how the 
countries correspond to certain elements of liberal intergovernmentalism. By analysing actions and 
decisions, this thesis shows the behaviour of the states can indeed be analysed through liberal 
intergovernmentalism, justifying the claims made in the primary goal if this research. The founding 
members are approached through a practical manner based on a combination of empirical evidence 
taken from secondary literature and political and economic analyses, as well inductive reasoning by 
looking at situations within the region, statements made by leaders and other high officials, and 
information gathered from literature, which then serve as the basis for reaching conclusions.  
 Due to the recent formation of the EaEU, concrete information on the project remains 
somewhat scarce. This thesis bases its conclusions mostly on inductive reasoning, which in turn is 
based on visible information. Therefore, it must be considered that the shortage of information 
available is likely to result in outcomes based on inductive assumptions and suggestions rather than 
set-in-stone outcomes. Although this thesis primarily relies on qualitative data, quantitative data is not 
entirely ignored. Certain economic indicators, ratings and other quantifiable data are considered in the 
process of regional integration. Other methods of quantitative research such as questionnaires are not 
used however. This is due to the limited timeframe in which the research is conducted, as finding 
suitable candidates to fill in the questionnaires on such a specific topic is a time-consuming task. In 
short, the primary methods to conduct this research stem from inductive reasoning based on 
information gathered from pre-existing literature, academic writings and data, perceivable situations 
within the countries and statements made by leaders, high officials and other individuals that are of 
importance.   
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CHAPTER 1: THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION 
The following chapter presents the necessary background information regarding the EaEU and 
its founding member states. The origin of the project is explained through previously failed attempts of 
post-Soviet integration, and indicates how the EaEU differs from these former attempts. This chapter 
discusses the organisational structure of the Union and argues it is a mere mimicry of its European 
counterpart, with institutions lacking true substance or function. Furthermore, this chapter provides 
country profiles of the three founding members and highlights what types of regime rule them. The 
regime types are important; as this proves liberal intergovernmentalism is not necessarily linked to 
liberal regimes.  
ORIGIN OF THE EAEU: FROM SOVIET UNION TO CUSTOMS UNION  
Despite its relatively recent establishment, the EaEU is preceded by a history of failed 
attempts to integrate the Eurasian region, which can be traced back to the early nineties. Even before 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26th in 1991, attempts to reorganise the region were 
already made. Mikhail Gorbachev, then president of the Soviet Union, made plans to form a Union of 
Sovereign States with other members of the Soviet Union, which was already in a state of disarray. 
These were reorganisation plans rather than integration plans. Leaders of various Soviet states never 
managed to agree on the formation of this Union however, and the 1991 August coup in Russia led to 
such a Union never being established. This failed attempt to reorganise the Soviet Union was directly 
followed by the first attempt of regional integration, involving independent states instead of 
reorganising a pre-existing body. This initiative became known as the CIS, an organisation that is still 
operating today. This organisation was officially established by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia and 
Belarus, as a successor entity to the Soviet Union which dissolved in December 1991.  
 Although the CIS still functions to this very date, its continued existence is not necessarily a 
testimony of it being successful as an organisation. At the time of its formation, many of the CIS 
members were new to the concept of being independent, and suddenly each individual state had their 
own interests to pursue instead the interests of the Soviet system. This has led to the CIS being 
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plagued by conflict due to diverging interests between participating countries, which heavily 
influenced affected its operations throughout the years. Several member states of the CIS shifted their 
position within the organisation due to changes on the global stage. Ukraine for example, despite 
being a founding member of the CIS, chose not to ratify the CIS charter but wished to remain involved 
as an associate member to not threaten their neutral position. Georgia on the other hand decided to 
fully withdraw from the CIS after the events of the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, showing that being 
part of the same initiative did not stop countries from waging war on one another. If the CIS was 
meant to be anything even close to a union, the heated conflicts between participants immediately 
discredited such aims.  
The tensions between members and the active pursuit of reaching individual goals led to many 
plans of integration either being partially implemented, or completely ignored. Initial attempts of 
integration in the economic sphere for example were made in 1994, when a Free Trade Agreement for 
CIS members was proposed. Most of the CIS members never bothered to ratify this agreement 
however, effectively rendering it obsolete. Moreover, there was no clear structure in economic ties 
within the CIS, which resulted in member states forming bilateral and multilateral agreements with 
states most beneficial to them, rather than using the overarching structure of the CIS (Czerewacz-
Filipowicz & Konopelko 2016). The organisation essentially lacked an effective institutional 
framework. As noted by Kubicek (2009: 242), cooperation within the CIS was based on consensus, 
resulting in the option to either adhere to CIS agreements or choose not to do so. This legal framework 
thus required zero dedication from participants towards the CIS. This also affected the overall 
effectiveness of the organisation, as indicated by unsuccessful attempts to improve legal 
harmonisation, customs clarification lists and railway tariffs (Zhalimbetova & Gleason 2001). Another 
issue was that the CIS was mostly based on Soviet institutions that did not function properly in the 
first place, which turned the CIS into was some refer to as a “paper organisation” (Hancock & Libman 
2014: 7).  
It is generally accepted that the CIS failed to truly integrate the post-Soviet region, but there 
are also some arguments in favour of the organisation. Early assessments made by Olcott, Åslund and 
Garnett (1999) for example claimed that the CIS is not entirely obsolete as an organisation, as it did 
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manage to mediate during the breakup of the Soviet Union and contributed to maintaining peace over 
border disputes in the region during chaotic times. They do however state that the CIS failed to form a 
functional mechanism for resolving trade disputes between members, and thus caused the situation in 
which most deals were made on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Konończuk (2007) argues that the 
CIS was nothing but a forum for periodic top-level meetings, providing participants with chances to 
create new bilateral or multilateral deals. More recent assessments made by Czerewacz-Filipowicz and 
Konopelko (2016: 30) confirm these claims, stating the CIS can still be perceived as a forum for high-
level debates rather than an actual organisation pushing economic integration. In short, the CIS seems 
to have served primarily as a tool to soften the blow of the Soviet dissolution, ensuring that not all 
intrinsic ties between former Soviet members would suddenly be severed. The CIS failed to be an 
effective driver for economic integration, however.  
The lack of progress made by the CIS quickly resulted in the need for an alternative project. 
Russia was the first to propose a full-fledged economic union in 1993, but this proposition was met 
with scepticism from others in the region that had just gained independence and feared renewed 
Russian dominance. Additionally, an overall lack of political will of states to initiate such a project 
disallowed the idea to gain any momentum (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2012). The earliest mention of an 
actual Eurasian Union was made in a speech by President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in 
1994. The official website of the EaEU published a document with excerpts of the speech, in which 
Nazarbayev notes the failures of the CIS to fulfil its obligations, and a new union built upon other 
principles could be the right solution (Prezident Respubliki Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbaev o evrazijskoj 
integratsii [President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev on Eurasian integration] 1994). 
In the following year, serious attempts to improve Eurasian integration were made through the idea of 
creating a customs union for post-Soviet states. These efforts eventually culminated in the Agreement 
on the Customs Union in 1995, which was initialised by Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan.  
One year after the signing of the 1995 agreement the three original founders, this time joined 
by Kyrgyzstan, signed a second treaty which focused on increased integration in economic and 
humanitarian spheres, improving living standards for civilians, protection of human rights and 
harmonisation of law among other objectives to pave the way towards the common market. Three 
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years later in 1999 a third treaty was signed, the Treaty on the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space. Despite the name creating the assumption the customs union was formed, the treaty 
merely identified the goals for the participating states to achieve the single economic space. The 
process of Eurasian integration appeared to gain prominence in 2000, with the establishment of the 
organisation known as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). In terms of organisational 
structure the EurAsEC was comparable to the European Economic Community, a precedent of the 
current EU, which marked the beginning of Eurasian organisations copying European models. The 
goal of this organisation was to stimulate the integration process and establish a common market for 
all participants (Mamlyuk 2014). Whereas the CIS had failed to achieve noteworthy economic 
integration, the EurAsEC managed to lift tariff and quota restrictions in the economic and trade 
spheres, and efforts to adopt a singular trading agreement were made (Vousinas 2014). This indicated 
that this new organisation had more potential than the CIS.  
Throughout the following decade, the EurAsEC aided the states involved in the integration 
process. The year 2010 marked a milestone for the organisation, as Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
officially formed the Customs Union, which was later renamed the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). 
By 2014 approximately eighty-four per cent of the import duties between members of the ECU were 
harmonised, and compared to its predecessors the ECU functioned well (Dreyer & Popescu 2014). 
Two years after its establishment the ECU was further expanded into the Eurasian Single Economic 
Space (SES), which was designed to promote the four main freedoms: the free movement of goods, 
capital, people and services. The establishment of the SES also led to the introduction of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission (EEC), which – when ignoring the faux institutions of the CIS – could be 
considered the first real supranational institution in twenty years of attempting to integrate the post-
Soviet region.  
This added new weight to the Eurasian integration process, as progress was now being made. 
In 2011, well before the establishment of the SES, Vladimir Putin had already stated that the 
establishment of an official Eurasian Union could become reality by 2015, and his judgement was 
impeccable. After fourteen years of operation, the EurAsEC was terminated and officially replaced by 
the EaEU on the first of January 2015. The accuracy of the statements made by Putin hint that the 
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establishment of the EaEU was more of a policy-driven action rather than being the result of 
successful progress in terms of integration between states. Such assumptions are shared by Garcés de 
los Fayos (2014). He believes the EaEU was hastily established through pressure from Moscow on 
other member states to reach the proposed deadline given by Putin four years earlier. This is no 
strange thought if one keeps in mind it took the EU forty years to develop to its current form, while the 
EaEU did the same in roughly fifteen years. After its formation, the EaEU started to present itself as a 
union driven by economic interests and an alternative for the EU (Lane 2014). The seemingly rushed 
establishment of the EaEU was one of the causes for scepticism however, and led to the belief that its 
motivations stemmed from geopolitical interests rather than economic ones; an effort made by Russia 
to block post-Soviet states from deeper cooperation with its European counterpart (Vilpišauskas, et al. 
2012). 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE: IMITATION IS THE SINCEREST FORM 
OF FLATTERY 
Now that some background information on the organisation was given, the organisational 
structure of the EaEU will be discussed. The EaEU and its institutional bodies are registered in the 
Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. The Treaty as well as the institutions it encompasses is, at 
least on paper, similar to the Treaty on the EU. Various terms have been used to describe the 
similarities between the EaEU framework and that of the EU. Nicu Popescu (2014) uses the term 
‘inspired’ when speaking of the EaEU framework compared to the EU. Dragneva and Wolczuk (2013) 
prefer the term ‘borrowed’ when speaking of elements found in the EaEU, whereas Vicari (2016) 
fancies the term ‘emulation’. Aliaksei Kazharski (2014) takes it one step further and divides emulation 
into two subcategories, lesson-drawing and mimicry, and argues that the latter can be derived from the 
construction of the EaEU. Whereas terms like ‘inspired’ and ‘borrowed’ are relatively positive or 
neutral, the definition of mimicry is more negative. Markus Hoehne (2009) extensively defined 
‘mimesis’ and ‘mimicry’ in his work, stating that the first is an attempt to imitate as a strategy to battle 
uncertainty, while mimicry helps concealing true intentions of those practicing it. Although the choice 
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of words may depend on personal perspectives of authors, it is undeniable that the EaEU used the 
institutional framework of the EU for its establishment.  
 The similarities with the EU are also reflected by the institutions representing the EaEU. Much 
like its European counterpart the EaEU has the EEC, a Court of the Eurasian Union, and a Eurasian 
Intergovernmental Council. In addition, the EaEU has a body known as the Supreme Eurasian Council 
(SC) which is led by the heads of state of participating nations. The EEC is the executive body of the 
Union, and is responsible for non-politicisation, improving efficiency and burry transparency and 
balancing interests (Eurasian Economic Commission 2017). Despite the EEC claiming its decisions 
are binding on members, its effectiveness is discredited by a few issues. The EEC may only operate 
and make decisions in specific areas, reducing its influence as an executive organ. Furthermore, the 
EEC must deal with monopolies and non-tariff barriers, both of which are still issues in the region 
(Roberts & Moshes 2015: 8). This hints at a lack of concrete power for this institution. The Court of 
the Union serves as the judicial body, and is the successor of the Court of the EurAsEC. The Court is 
approachable by commercial actors from inside and outside the Union to challenge decisions made by 
the EEC. This new Court arguably lost some of its power compared to its predecessor, as it lost 
various privileges and rights that its predecessor had (van der Togt, Montesano & Kozak 2015: 24). 
Moreover, the Court is undermined by lacklustre attitudes of members towards its rulings caused by 
weak disciplinary and enforcement mechanisms that affected post-Soviet integration since the 
formation of the CIS (Dragneva 2016: 17). Rulings are perceived as recommendations that can be 
adhered to voluntarily rather than binding measures. 
 The Intergovernmental Council (IC) is comprised of the heads of government of each member 
state. This body must ensure the implementation and control the performance of the EaEU Treaty, 
international treaties and decisions made by the presidents, as well as considering issues on which the 
EEC could not reach consensus and issue instructions to the EEC. The IC may intervene with 
decisions made by the EEC whenever it deems it necessary, even when consensus in the EEC has 
already been reached. The IC can be perceived as an intermediary institution rather than a full-
functioning body, as the SC takes decisions on similar matters but has even greater power. The SC is 
the highest authority in the EaEU and has the right to determine the composition of the EEC and 
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terminate its powers; it appoints the judges of the Court and can exercise ‘other powers’ which are not 
further specified by the Treaty (Treaty on the EaEU 2015). The SC also has the jurisdiction to get 
involved with Court decisions, whenever rulings are not implemented by those involved. Furthermore, 
the SC determines which issues are ‘sensitive’ and may not be discussed in the EEC. Essentially, the 
SC represents the pinnacle of the EaEU decision-making process. This leads power vertical in which 
each institution can overrule another, except for the SC. Such a construction casts doubts on whether 
the EaEU’s institutions truly hold supranational power.  
MEMBER STATES OF THE EAEU: MEET THE FOUNDING FATHERS  
The EaEU is currently comprised of five members: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan. This thesis focuses its attention on the three founding members to narrow its scope, but 
still consider a large member, a medium-sized member and a small member of the Union. Despite 
having merely five members, the EaEU accommodates approximately 182.7 million people as of 
January 2016 (Eurasian Economic Union 2016), and covers around fifteen per cent of the world 
surface. The Union is characterised by extreme asymmetry between member states in terms of size, 
economic power and demographics, with Russia accounting for more than eighty per cent of the 
Union’s GDP (Kirkham 2016).  
 Something that differentiates EaEU member states from their EU counterparts, despite 
following a similar institutional framework, is how the countries are ruled. Whereas the EU attempts 
to promote liberal democratic values, the founding members of the EaEU can be described as 
autocratic. The term autocracy is used to describe regimes where a single leader or a small group of 
elites hold most power, and rule through a highly-centralised power vertical. Such structures are 
prominently present in all three of the founding members. Belarus is under the incumbent rule of 
President Aleksandr Lukashenka. He was the first to assume office as President of Belarus in 1994, 
and has not left the position since. Due to his authoritarian style of ruling Lukashenka has sometimes 
been referred to as “the last dictator in Europe” (van der Togt 2017). There are various political parties 
in Belarus, but these hold little political influence as shown by unsuccessful boycotts against 
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Lukashenka in the past (Kulik & Pshizova 2005). Bakunowicz (2015) adds that several officially 
registered parties are in fact “façade parties” endorsing the president, and that real opposition is kept at 
bay through various forms of repression (intimidation, arrests, and prison sentences). The existence of 
opposition in Belarus appears to be little more than a tool for Lukashenka to create the suggestion that 
his country is democratic.   
 Like his Belarusian colleague, Nursultan Nazarbayev was the first to assume the office of 
president in his country. Nazarbayev has been in power since 1991, and remains the unchallenged 
leader of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev has not shunned from using his presidential power to his own 
benefits. In 1995, he increased his presidential power by amending the Kazakh constitution, 
disadvantaging other branches of government in the process (Heinrich 2010: 27). Nazarbayev is the 
head of the Nur Otan Party, which is currently the most dominant party in Kazakhstan. The party 
managed to gain significant power through presidential endorsement, for example by using control 
administrative resources unavailable to opposition, persecution of opposition politicians, and the use 
of legislation to fulfil personal interests (Boban 2017: 74). Furthermore, Kazakh governance is 
characterised by high degrees of nepotism. Henderson (2000: 492) notes that many high-level 
positions are taken by those related to the incumbent leader, including Nazarbayev’s son-in-law and 
stepdaughter being the vice president of Kazakhoil and CEO of the main television station 
respectively. Henderson refers to this nepotistic web as “the Nazarbayev clan,” who chooses to share 
wealth with competing elite clans to subdue tendencies to oppose the regime.  
 Russia is currently under the rule of Vladimir Putin, who first became president of Russia in 
2000 and remained in office until 2008. Unlike Lukashenka and Nazarbayev Putin stepped down as 
president in 2008, as the Russian constitution disallows more than two consecutive terms. Putin 
became Prime Minister under Dmitry Medvedev, yet maintained significant power in this role. 
Historian Daniil Kotsyubinsky (2012) refers to the situation as “Dmitry Medvedev’s powerless 
presidency and Vladimir Putin’s all-powerful premiership.” In 2012 Putin won the presidential 
elections and switched roles again with Medvedev. While not officially in power, Putin maintained 
control through what can be referred to as a duumvirate. Putin has kept certain individuals close to him 
during his rule. Such individuals are often referred to as oligarchs and siloviki in academic literature. 
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Originally the term silovik was used to describe influential current or former officials of government 
bodies, but modern siloviki are also found in private organisations (Bremmer & Charap 2007: 86). 
Both oligarchs and siloviki are considered part of Putin’s ‘inner circle’. These elites are an influential 
group within the Kremlin and often personally acquainted with Putin, creating a personalised web of 
interests.  
Pierre Hassner (2008: 10) argues that Russia has been moving away from democratic values 
ever since Putin came to power, creating a more authoritarian system by centralising his power in 
Russia while at the same time maintaining the illusion of democracy. This notion is supported by 
Mark Galeotti and Andrew Bowen (2014), who stated that contemporary Russia has progressively 
become more autocratic under Putin’s rule. More recently, Nelli Babayan (2016) of the organisation 
GMF argued that over the past few years the regimes in each of the countries participating in the 
EaEU have become more autocratic, disregarding previous rhetorical commitments of their leaders to 
increase levels of democracy. The regimes of the founding members make for an interesting research, 
as empirical evidence has shown that autocracies are less likely to adopt a cooperative stance in 
international relations (Leeds & Davis 1999), likely due to the chances of supranational organisations 
threatening national monopolies on power. Despite this, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus chose to 
establish the EaEU, raising the question as to why they would do such a thing. This question can be 
approached through the liberal intergovernmentalist framework, which is discussed in the following 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCING THE LIBERAL 
INTERGOVERNMENTALIST PERSPECTIVE 
The following chapter outlines the liberal intergovernmentalist framework, and further 
elaborates why this framework was chosen. Furthermore, some general background information on the 
rivalling theory, neo-functionalism, is given to show why liberal intergovernmentalism could in fact 
be the better option. The chapter continues to explain which parts of the liberal intergovernmentalist 
framework are used and why these were chosen for this research.  
NEO-FUNCTIONALISM VERSUS LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
Various frameworks for regional integration were developed in the early years of the EU, as 
an attempt to explain its integration process. Neo-functionalism was the first major theory to solely 
focus on EU regional integration. The theory was first proposed by Ernst Haas, who believed the 
process of political integration was: “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation states” (Haas 1958: 16). 
This theory argues that individual states are not the most important actors in the integration process, 
relying on the importance of supranational entrepreneurs and institutions instead. Neo-functionalists 
consider the integration process to be linear, thus once it is instigated it becomes increasingly difficult 
to stop, or even slow down its progression. The concept of spill-over is the main driver of integration 
according to neo-functionalism. Functional spill-over is the expansion of integrative activities from 
one sector to another (Lindberg & Scheingold (1970: 7), whereas political spill-over is an increase of 
politicisation of sectoral activities (Rhodes & Mazey 1995: 31).  
The liberal intergovernmentalist framework was conceived out of criticism on Haas’ neo-
functionalist theory. This stream of thought is inseparably connected to its founder, Andrew 
Moravcsik. Moravcsik argued that certain elements of neo-functionalism only occurred in exceptional 
cases, thus discrediting the empirical value of the neo-functionalist assumptions. He further believed 
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that ‘Haasian’ neo-functionalism was not suited for analysing contemporary European integration 
(Moravcsik 2005: 351). Therefore, Moravcsik devised his own framework, mostly drawing inspiration 
from his critiques on neo-functionalism and, to a lesser extent, traditional intergovernmentalism. This 
new realist theory became known as liberal intergovernmentalism, and is presented by Moravcsik as a 
baseline theory of regional integration. The theory was built upon the notion that integration is not the 
result of unstoppable spill-over, but rather a product of intensive bargaining between nation states. 
Moravcsik argued that: “from the signing of the Treaty of Rome to the making of Maastricht the EC 
has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains” (Moravcsik 1993). Liberal 
intergovernmentalism departs from traditional intergovernmentalism by denying the affixed 
preferences of wealth, power and security as proposed by the former, since doing so turns states into 
standardised ‘black boxes’ (Moravcsik 1993: 481).  
MORAVCIK’S VISION: THE FRAMEWORK EXPLAINED 
The liberal intergovernmentalist framework stresses that the participating nation states in the 
process of regional integration, regardless of (geo) political or economic motives, are the most 
important drivers for integration and determine the speed of the entire process. Moravcsik (1993) 
argued that member states of an integrating bloc always attempt to guard their own national interests 
by attempting to limit the transfer of sovereignty, thus avoid granting supreme authority to 
supranational institutions that could threaten national sovereignty. Moreover, Moravcsik considers 
states to be rational actors responding to external stimuli, and attempts to explain how collective 
decisions by national governments lead to integration (Moravcsik 2005). The liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework as invented by Moravcsik is a tripartite framework, dividing the 
process of regional integration into three major steps. The first step revolves around national 
preference formation, the second step discusses interstate bargaining, and the final step of the 
framework considers the institutional choices made based on steps one and two.  
 National preference formation according to Moravcsik (1998: 20) does not simply involve a 
set of policy goals, but rather attempts to look at a set of underlying national objectives formed by 
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wishes of various domestic groupings. The liberal intergovernmentalist framework suggests that 
national preferences can be based on either politico-economic motivations, or geopolitical 
motivations. In Moravcsik’s view, choosing one of the two motivations automatically results in the 
other being of lesser importance; it is either economics over geopolitics or geopolitics over economics. 
While not entirely excluding geopolitical factors throughout his analyses of European integration, 
Moravcsik has concluded that politico-economic factors are of greater importance than geopolitical 
ones, claiming that the main reasons for countries to join the EU came from tight economic constraints 
rather than security concerns (Moravcsik 1998: 7). To prove these statements, Moravcsik focused his 
attention on Germany, France and Great Britain, and came to the mentioned conclusion of economics 
outweighing geopolitics.  
 The second step of the liberal intergovernmentalist framework is interstate bargaining, which 
can only be analysed once the underlying goals of nations are identified. Moravcsik applies two 
dimensions of bargaining outcomes into his framework; the first being the nation’s efficiency in 
bargaining, the second being distributional outcomes. These dimensions analyse whether governments 
manage to exploit all potential agreements to their fullest during negotiations, thus showing efficiency, 
and how benefits are divided among participants once negotiations are concluded, thus showing the 
distribution of gains (Moravcsik 1998: 51). Through this method, it should be possible to find out 
which countries benefitted the most from the bargaining process. Moravcsik advocates the liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach of bargaining, which suggests that national governments are well-
informed when entering negotiations, have no need for the aid of supranational actors in the 
negotiating process, and uphold relations based on asymmetrical interdependence. Additionally, this 
theory argues that negotiations are mostly aimed towards the distribution of gains and agreements can 
be made without any further supranational intervention (Moravcsik 1998: 55), showing the state-
centred outlook of the theory.  
 The final step in the liberal intergovernmentalist framework is institutional choice. In this step 
participating nations decide in what ways they shall provide power to supranational institutions to 
secure the bargains which were agreed upon in the second step. This process, which is described by 
Moravcsik as the ‘constraining’ of sovereignty, can occur in two possible ways. Firstly, it can occur 
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through the pooling of sovereignty. Secondly, it could be done through the delegation of sovereignty. 
Pooling of sovereignty occurs when governments agree to implement voting procedures other than 
unanimity voting. The delegation of sovereignty happens when national actors agree to provide 
supranational actors with the authority to make certain autonomous decisions without intervention of 
interstate votes or threats of veto (Moravcsik 1998: 67). When applying the framework to European 
integration, Moravcsik concluded that power is pooled or delegated to lock participants into credible 
commitments (Moravcsik 1998: 70). Through this perspective, supranational institutions are tools for 
national states to ensure they receive their end of the bargain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CHOICE FOR LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
 Although neo-functionalism is used in a variety of academic literature, and its potential value 
for analysing the region of the EaEU is recognised by the author of this thesis, there are reasons to 
believe liberal intergovernmentalism is a suitable theory for the region as well, if not a superior theory. 
Firstly, neo-functionalism was conceptualised during the earliest stages of European integration, 
whereas liberal intergovernmentalism was created after integration had progressed further. Despite 
being a young organisation, the EaEU underwent roughly the same steps as the EU did yet in a shorter 
amount of time, meaning the organisation has already passed the earliest stages of integration. This 
leads to the belief that Moravcsik’s criticism on Haasian neo-functionalism not fitting contemporary 
Figure 1: visualisation of the liberal intergovernmentalist framework (Moravcsik 
1998: 24) 
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trends of integration may also be applied to the EaEU. Secondly, as mentioned in the first chapter the 
EaEU shows many similarities to its European counterpart, both in the steps undertaken in the 
integration process as well as similarities between their legal frameworks. One could logically assume 
that theories of European integration can also be applied to another organisation that so closely 
follows the EU’s example.  
 Choosing liberal intergovernmentalism over neo-functionalism is further based on several 
perceivable factors in the EaEU. The first factor is the autocratic nature of participating regimes. Neo-
functionalism supports the notion of integration being an unstoppable linear process once instigated, 
and spill-over results in integration of other sectors. While suitable for the liberal democracies within 
the EU, autocratic regimes are known to avoid decisions that could threaten their authority and power. 
With this key characteristic of autocracies in mind, it could be argued that such regimes are inherently 
intergovernmentalist. Furthermore, the protectionist attitude of autocrats towards their power debunks 
the idea of an unstoppable, linear process. It is a viable thought that autocratic states are more prone to 
completely halt, or outright reverse the integration process as soon as the risk of losing too much 
power becomes evident, and will block any kind of spill-over in key sectors where they do not wish 
any kind of external interference.  
 Further reason to believe liberal intergovernmentalism is more suitable than its rivalling theory 
stems from its focus on the nation state. Neo-functionalism places the national governments in a lesser 
role, arguing that non-state (supranational) actors are of greater importance in the process of regional 
integration. Harkening back to the fact that the EaEU member states are perceived as autocracies with 
centralised governance protecting their own positions, it would make little sense to choose a theory 
that neglects the nation state as the single most important actor in the process of integration. The state-
centred nature on which the liberal intergovernmentalist theory is built appears to be much more 
fitting when looking at the region involved with the EaEU. Moreover, Moravcsik claims that the will 
of national leaders is reflected in the integration process, giving them an important role as drivers of 
integration. Keeping the powerful positions of the leaders in the founding countries in mind, liberal 
intergovernmentalism once again seems to be the more logical choice.  
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FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: OPERATIONALISING THE FRAMEWORK  
 There are certain issues that must be taken account when using the liberal intergovernmentalist 
framework for the EaEU. Firstly, the framework as shown in figure one is a basic representation of the 
liberal intergovernmentalist framework. In his work, Moravcsik provides an extremely fleshed out 
version of the framework, yet for this thesis the basic framework as presented above is sufficient for 
various reasons. Firstly, the narrow scope of this thesis makes it impossible to discuss each element 
present in the framework. Secondly, Moravcsik seems to have made the framework in such a way that 
several elements within it cater to the needs of his research on the EU, meaning that certain parts of 
the framework would not fit the EaEU to begin with. This thesis therefore only utilises elements from 
the basic framework to avoid unnecessary detail and redundant elements in its analysis of the EaEU’s 
founders. Furthermore, this thesis deliberately chooses to ignore the third step of the framework. The 
main question of this thesis revolves around why the EaEU was founded, which can be answered with 
the help national preferences and interstate bargaining. Institutional choice is the result of step one and 
two however, and is of little relevance for the main question. Additionally, as shown in the first 
chapter, the institutions of the EaEU are mimics of its EU counterpart and are still overruled by the 
national leaders. This leads to the conclusion that sovereignty has neither been pooled nor delegated, 
thus making the third step useless.  
 Following the first step of the framework, this thesis attempts to find plausible sources of 
underlying national preferences. Since it remains unclear whether the Union is truly economic or in 
fact a geopolitical initiative, both politico-economic and geopolitical motivations are considered. 
Moravcsik notes various reasons for geopolitically motivated integration, including balancing of 
power, superpower balancing strategy, and regional integration to reduce chances of conflict among 
member states. He furthermore recognises that geopolitical ideologies are linked to security issues, 
such as adverting threats to territorial sovereignty (Moravcsik 1998: 27). Economically motivated 
integration may stem from issues such as economic crises, opportunities for innovation, diversification 
and trade. Moravcsik identifies five dimensions, which are used to predict the source of underlying 
objectives. This thesis applies the two dimensions which it considers to be most important: timing and 
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domestic actors1. Timing is an essential dimension as it provides insights as to why the founding 
members chose to establish the Union specifically now. This thesis attempts to answer that question by 
looking at significant economic and geopolitical shifts from around 2011 and beyond, which could 
influence the speed of the integration process. Domestic actors are relevant because Moravcsik’s 
theory suggests they are the ones who determine the national preferences. In the autocratic EaEU 
states domestic groupings are less powerful however, and it is therefore important to discuss whose 
preferences are pushed forward in the integration process.  
 The intergovernmental bargaining theory of the second step is applied to examine the relative 
bargaining positions of each of the founding member states, and discusses the asymmetrical 
interdependence between them. This is done through various methods. Firstly, this thesis discusses 
how the three member states are independent based on political and economic links. Secondly, the 
research looks at demands made by the founding members and whether these demands were met, thus 
signifying bargaining strength vis-à-vis the others participating in the negotiations. Thirdly, 
Moravcsik’s idea of asymmetrical independence argues that relative bargaining positions are 
strengthened or weakened through unilateral or coalitional alternatives. When a state has viable 
unilateral alternatives, it can threaten to veto policies suggested in the Union and instead follow its 
own course. Alternative coalitions occur when states opt to work together with one another to acquire 
better deals and more bargaining power, but they only work if the coalition can exert influence over 
countries excluded from the coalition. Finding out more about the relative bargaining positions of each 
of the founding members may clarify why they decided to join the integration project. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 For more information on the remaining three dimensions, see table 1.2 in Moravcsik’s The Choice for Europe: 
Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht (1998: 28).  
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CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL PREFERENCES – THE GEOPOLITICS 
AND ECONOMICS 
This chapter begins with analysing the national preferences of the founding members of the 
EaEU based on the dimensions of the framework. The first dimension to be discussed is timing. 
Economic and geopolitical events that are likely to have influenced the willingness of the founding 
members to join the integration process are taken into consideration. The chapter then continues to 
show which individuals are primarily responsible for the formation of these preferences, thus 
identifying the domestic actors involved. The chapter proceeds to give an overview of the actual 
preferences per member state based on timing and domestic actors combined with foreign policies and 
opinions of relevant individuals, for example the presidents of each state. Plausible conclusions on 
national preferences are then formed by the end of this chapter.   
TIMING IS KEY: CATALYSTS FOR INTEGRATION 
The idea of establishing a Eurasian Union had been floating around since the early nineties, 
yet concrete plans to do it were made approximately two decades later in 2011. There are several 
major events, both geopolitical and economic, that can help explain why the plans for creating the 
EaEU suddenly gained momentum. First to be discussed are geopolitical events that possibly triggered 
the member states to establish the EaEU. The timing of the initial announcement of a Eurasian Union 
possibly being founded is the first reason why some consider the Union to be geopolitical in nature. 
The news article in which Putin voiced the idea of creating the Union was published not even a week 
after a summit conference in Warsaw between the EU and participants of the European Partnership 
Programme (EaP). This is a programme aimed towards improving economic and political ties between 
the EU and its neighbours in Eastern Europe through deeper cooperation. Adomeit (2012: 3) is 
convinced that the timing of Putin’s news article is linked to this conference, and reflects the 
geopolitical nature of the project. 
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 Adomeit supports his argument by stating several important prospect members for a Eurasian 
Union were participating in the EaP, such as Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova. The absence of those 
three would result in a Central Asian Union with a “Belarusian appendix.” This perspective thus 
suggests the announcement of a Eurasian Union was a response to counterbalance the growing 
influence of the EU in Eastern Europe, and to safeguard the balance between Central Asian and Slavic 
member states. The propositions made by Adomeit find some degree of verification in Russia’s 
attempts to convince Ukraine to join the project, which it tried to do by offering Ukraine hefty 
discounts on energy imports. On the other hand, Russia threatened to cancel preferential trade 
agreements should Ukraine seek deeper cooperation with the EU (Krickovic 2014: 504). Albeit 
convincing, these arguments can be countered by looking at the domestic situation in Russia at the 
time. Presidential elections were coming up in March 2012, which could imply that the idea of a 
Eurasian Union was merely part of Putin’s campaign to gather support for his presidency, and the EaP 
summit coincidentally occurred around the same time.  
The EU is not the only reason for security-related fears, as the increasing presence of China in 
the region poses as a potential threat too. China, although fickle, is nowadays considered as an ally of 
Russia that supports actions against Western dominance. However, China has become an increasingly 
important actor in Central Asia through the trade of hydrocarbons and oil, arguably surpassing Russia 
in terms of economic influence in the region (Peyrouse 2016), threatening Russia’s dominion. Aside 
from the growing influence of the EU and China, regional conflicts, for example the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the rise of extremism and terrorism in nearby 
countries is another viable reason for the swift formation of the EaEU. In this sense, the EaEU serves 
as a bulwark for protecting its members from terrorist threats, as an attack on one is an attack on the 
entire Union. Although regional security is officially a task of another organisation, The Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), accession into the EaEU could be a way for members to ensure 
military protection from Russia.  
Another perspective implying that the EaEU was the result of geopolitical shifts is the notion 
that the EaEU served as a response to the increased levels of globalisation and the threat of 
democratisation. This perspective also relates to the EaP, as cooperation with the EU often comes 
 
24 
paired with efforts of the EU to promote democratic values in participating states (Shapovalova & 
Youngs 2012). Memories of spreading democracy in the post-Soviet space often go hand in hand with 
so-called ‘colour revolutions’. These revolutions previously occurred in Georgia and Ukraine, and 
involved bringing down autocratic leaderships in exchange for more democratic rule. Thus, the spread 
of democracy is not necessarily favourable for the autocratic regimes found in the EaEU members, as 
their regimes may too become susceptible to such revolutions should democratic tendencies take root 
in society. With the EU slowly spreading its influence eastwards, the threat of democracy-demanding 
revolutions has become more realistic, and the fear of colour revolutions has sharply increased in 
Russia and Central Asia (Korsunskaya 2014).  
As such, the establishment of the EaEU can be described as an attempt to ‘promote’ 
autocracies instead of democracies; an attempt in which authoritarian regimes choose to integrate – or 
create the illusion they are integrating – to shield their regimes from external democratic influences 
that threaten their position (Hancock & Libman 2014: 17). This idea is further supported by Lane 
(2014), who believes the EaEU attempts to position itself as a conservative alternative for the 
otherwise globalised neo-liberal system, seeking to prevent the loss of sovereignty of its member 
states. Harkening back to statements made in the first chapter of this thesis, which mentioned the 
regimes of EaEU members becoming increasingly autocratic over the years, the idea of the EaEU 
being a counteroffensive against encroaching democratisation makes sense. The increasingly 
repressive actions undertaken by those in charge serve as evidence of attempts to supress any possible 
efforts to topple the regime.  
Besides the announcement and actual establishment of the Union, the timeframe in which the 
project was realised indicates that geopolitical motivations were most likely involved. The EU took 
forty years to undergo the steps from a free trade area to an economic union, whereas the EaEU did so 
in roughly fifteen years. Putin stated in 2011 that the EaEU would possibly come into force on the first 
of January in 2015, and so it did. The entire process of the establishment of the EaEU, from the 
Customs Union to its official launch, was described by Roberts and Moshes (2015) as a “headlong 
rush.” The tempo of negotiations to launch the Union has further been described as “excessively 
rapid,” which resulted in a lack of agreements in certain areas (Jarosiewicz & Fischer 2015). The 
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hastiness in which the project was conceived was mostly possible through Russian efforts, leading to 
claims of the project being forced on others by Russia (Strzelecki 2016). Nazarbayev even commented 
on the rushed pace of integration, saying there was enough time to adopt a more moderate pace (Daly 
2014: 89). The suspiciously rapid tempo, as well as the efforts put into the project by Russia, makes it 
seem like the establishment of the EaEU was an attempt to reach a deadline rather than creating a 
well-functioning unified body.  
Since the founding members of the EaEU insist the project is economic, there should be some 
economic catalysts next to the geopolitical ones as well. The first and foremost reason to believe the 
EaEU was indeed an economic initiative can be derived from the bleak economic situations in the 
founding members around the time of the EaEU’s announcement. The global economic crisis of 2008 
led to steep drops in oil prices, a resource that mostly carries both the economies of Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Although by 2011 Russia’s GDP had grown again, it was still much lower than pre-crisis 
levels, and Finance Minister Sergey Storchak predicted a “difficult 2012,” in terms of economy (Weiss 
2012). The economic situation in Belarus was also dire in 2011, with an official devaluation of the 
Belarusian rouble and rising unemployment (Dudko 2011). The worrisome conditions of the 
economies of the founding members make for a sensible reason to start the integration process; this 
makes the EaEU an organisation meant to counter the lingering effects of the economic crisis, and 
improve economic prosperity among its members. Oil prices tumbled further in 2014, which may be 
an explanation as to why the formation of the Union was suddenly rushed.  
What makes it fundamentally difficult to believe statements on the EaEU being purely 
economic, is the fact that aside from the worsening economic situations there are little economic 
catalysts that can be attributed to the formation of the Union. As mentioned, possible economic 
reasons to integrate are opportunities to remedy crises, increase diversification, innovation and trade. 
From these four opportunities only two are applicable to the EaEU, namely countering the economic 
crisis and the possibility of increasing trade through liberalisation of laws. Innovation and 
diversification are severely lacking in all three of the founding members, however. Both Kazakhstan 
and Russia are heavily dependent on the sales of raw resources such as oil and gas, whereas Belarus in 
turn is dependent on the Russian economy. The homogeneity of the Russian, Belarusian and Kazakh 
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markets creates little opportunity to diversify. Furthermore, innovation is difficult achieve due to the 
backwards nature of the founding members, which Kirkham (2016) even refers to as “technological 
retardation.” Kirkham adds homogeneity could be turned into something positive if all members work 
together to achieve a ‘reindustrialisation’. While this could be possible, it requires members to start 
sharing their industrial sectors with other members, which means giving up sovereignty in sectors that 
are of strategic importance.  
When looking at catalysts that possibly contributed to the sudden initiation of the integration 
process, it clearly shows most of them are geopolitical in nature rather than economic. Except for the 
2008 economic crisis, which was a cause for the steep drop in oil prices, there are little significant 
economic events that could serve as catalysts for the formation of the EaEU. On the other hand, there 
were a handful of geopolitical events that most likely contributed, which indicates that, in terms of 
timing, the establishment of the EaEU was done out of geopolitical motivations instead of economic 
ones.  
DOMESTIC ACTORS: RULE OF THE FEW 
In respect of the liberal intergovernmentalist framework, the domestic actors within a state are 
responsible for the formation of its national preferences. The theory suggests that geopolitically driven 
integration is dictated by actors such as the chief executive, ministers for defence and foreign relations, 
as well as the elite and public opinion. Economic integration on the other hand is led by the chief 
executive, ruling parties and economic officials. As mentioned in the first chapter, the three founding 
members are characterised by centralised power verticals, with presidents and select groups of people 
in charge. In a work by Dragneva and Wolczuk (2015: 11-13) it is noted that both policy making and 
preference formation are centralised within the EaEU member states, and objectives and visions of the 
presidents are the main determining factors for participating in Eurasian integration. They further add 
there is little evidence of ‘domestic coalitions’ influencing Eurasian integration, thus the presence of 
bottom-up demand is difficult to prove. The weight of the presidential influence is further underlined 
by Kudaibergenova (2016: 8), who states that actors besides the president such as prime ministers, 
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party leaders and members of opposition either tend to agree with presidential discourses, or dispute 
them without offering any viable alternatives, thus leading to nothing.  
 Although these statements and visible power structures make clear the presidents of each state 
have the final say, it is worthwhile looking at other potential groupings that may have influence on the 
willingness of leaders to enter the project. Earlier in this thesis the so-called Russian siloviki were 
mentioned. In an interview, Mark Galeotti, Senior Researcher at the Institute of International Relations 
Prague describes the siloviki as a group that provides Putin with the information he thinks he must 
know, while also ensuring ministries are performing the tasks they are given by the president (Galeotti 
2017). Certain siloviki can be found in private businesses, which may benefit from integrating the 
region. Igor Sechin, former Deputy Prime Minister and current Executive Chairman of Russian oil 
company Rosneft, is a good example of such a silovik. Further integration could increase the 
competitiveness of Rosneft in regional markets, which would benefit Sechin’s personal gain. 
However, the influence of the siloviki is disputed by the various ‘reshuffles’ made by Putin, who for 
example replaced two regional governors who were involved in corruption scandals (Korgunyuk 
2016). This indicates that ultimately the president controls the siloviki, and their power is limited to 
their advisory role and ensuring presidential rule while attempting to avoid aggravating Putin, lest they 
lose their beneficial positions.  
The situation in Kazakhstan is slightly different, with the presence of various groupings or 
clans next to Nazarbayev’s own. Despite the presence of multiple clans, Nazarbayev has managed to 
keep the elite mostly in check by making sure they were sufficiently funded, though the Kazakh elite 
appear to be quite volatile under certain circumstances. In 2015 for example, when Kazakhstan was 
experiencing economic hardships, rivalry between governmental elites started to rise as income was 
decreasing (Jarosiewicz 2015). Furthermore, even within Nazarbayev’s own clan there are divergences 
in opinions. Timur Kulibayev, Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, does not share the same ideas for economic 
development for example, and neither do the people close to him (Hagelund & Maplecroft 2016). 
Nevertheless, Nazarbayev has managed to stay in power for decades and determined the direction of 
Kazakhstan as a country, which signifies his influence as president and as a decision-maker. The 
capability of Nazarbayev to create balance between the elite groupings shows his effectiveness as a 
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leader, but may also prove dangerous for the future. Throughout the years there has only been 
Nazarbayev, and no successor has been appointed yet. Nazarbayev’s death may result in the disruption 
of the balance between clans that he created, as the elite will be fighting for control over the country 
(Stratfor 2013). This is an issue for future research however, and currently Nazarbayev remains the 
most powerful man in Kazakhstan.  
The power division in Belarus is arguably the easiest to explain. Lukashenka, “the last dictator 
in Europe,” is by far the most powerful man in the country. Unlike Russia and Kazakhstan, Belarus 
never experienced the problem of overly powerful oligarchs influencing politics since the market was 
never privatised, not even partially. This means there is not really a group of influential businessmen 
like that in Russia or Kazakhstan besides ministers and politicians close to Lukashenka. Additionally, 
whereas siloviki and oligarchs are present in Russia, and clans in Kazakhstan, Belarus has no apparent 
division between powerful groups. Admittedly, there exists such a thing as siloviki in Belarus, but 
most of these individuals came in from Russia (Karatch 2016), and are directly subordinated to the 
will of Lukashenka.  
The situations in all three of the founding member states essentially show the same elements. 
There is one powerful leader who makes major decisions whilst being surrounded by elites or 
acquaintances. Although some of these elites may be influential domestically, they do not have enough 
influence to distract the presidents from their own visions or goals on the global stage. This is shown 
through Putin’s control over the elite groupings in Russia, Nazarbayev’s control over the clans despite 
inner turmoil, and Lukashenka ruling without any opposition or alternative factions. Even if certain 
members of the elite in Russia and Kazakhstan had their doubts about integration, they were not 
influential enough to change the minds of their presidents, or simply did not voice their opinions. It 
can thus be stated that the national preferences in the case of the founding members of the EaEU are 
determined by their national leaders alone. 
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PREFERENCES EXPLAINED: WHO WANTS WHAT?  
RUSSIA 
Now that an overview of events and domestic actors is given, the national preferences of each 
individual state are discussed. In earlier chapters, it was shown that claims of the EaEU being a 
geopolitical initiative are usually related to its instigation by Russia. When keeping in mind the history 
of Russia and its foreign policies, such claims are hardly surprising. Historically speaking Russia has 
belonged to the largest and most powerful players on the global stage, constructing an image of Russia 
as one of the more imposing countries of the international community. After the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, followed by a deep economic crisis in 1998, Russia was stripped of its superpower 
status. Eventually, some even started referring to Russia as a ‘failed state’ (Willerton, Beznosov & 
Carrier 2005: 225), which was a significant demotion compared to Russia’s previous image. Although 
Russia lost its status as a global superpower, the idea of Russia still being one is thoroughly promoted 
by president Putin, only under the modern moniker of ‘great power’. Under his leadership, the 
ideology of being a great power became an intrinsic feature of Russian foreign policy, affecting both 
Russia as its neighbouring states (Oldberg 2007). Putin has furthermore not attempted to hide his 
geopolitical ambitions. During his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2003, Putin made clear 
statements related to Russia’s position including words as “Such a country as Russia can only survive 
and develop within the existing borders if it stays a great power. During all its times of weakness, 
Russia was invariably confronted with the threat of disintegration” (Putin 2003).  
 The geopolitical focus of Russian foreign policy has since been repeatedly underlined. Dmitry 
Medvedev announced that Russia had the right to interfere in what he referred to as geopolitical 
“spheres of privileged interest” (Medvedev 2008). Medvedev believed it to be natural for Russia to 
view post-Soviet republics, with the exclusion of the Baltic States, as key strategic zones for Russian 
interests (Trenin 2009). Another term oft-used in Russian foreign policy is Russkii Mir (Russian 
World), which gained prominence in 2014. Research Professor Marlene Laruelle (2015) coined the 
concept of the Russian World as a “geopolitical imagination, a fuzzy mental atlas on which different 
regions of the world and their different links to Russia can be articulated in a fluid way.” This fluid 
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articulation refers to the difficulty of concretely interpreting the term Russian World; there is no set 
definition and it can thus be used in various situations to justify certain actions or policy discourse. 
The conflict in Ukraine which started in 2013 can be used as an example of this Russian World, as 
Moscow claimed the intervention in Eastern Ukraine was to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the 
region.  
 These policies and ideologies strongly hint at Putin’s preference formation being aimed at 
maintaining its identity as a great power, whilst also securing the influence it has in the post-Soviet 
space. Maintaining both influence and reputation fit into Putin’s idea of creating a ‘multipolar world’. 
Classical understandings of a multipolar world were linked to the balance of power, whereas modern 
definitions can be defined as a global international system inhabited by conglomerations of economic 
interests united around the strongest centres of economic growth (Deutsch & Singer 1964; Lukyanov 
2010). The initiative by Putin to form an economic bloc thus supports the definition of a modern 
multipolar world, as the EaEU would become a new centre of economic growth. Looking back at 
possible geopolitical reasons for integration, Russian contemporary foreign policy appears to fit the 
superpower balancing strategy, which suggests that regional integration can be used to bolster the 
power and autonomy of a state in a world dominated by other powers. While currently the term 
‘superpower’ may be outdated, as it was mostly used during the Cold War, it can simply be replaced 
with ‘great power’ or ‘pole’ to allow modern-day usage.  
 Putin’s constant obsession with proving his country is a great power, as well as claims of 
privileged influence spheres, only support earlier statements about the EaEU being a 
countermovement against growing influence of other actors in the region. The EU and its promotion of 
democratisation could result in countries breaking away from Russia in Eastern Europe, while China is 
overtaking Russia in terms of economic influence in Central Asia, neither of which is acceptable for 
Putin. This is one of the reasons which could explain why the Union was so hastily established; Putin 
sought to establish the Union as quickly as possible to consolidate Russia’s position as the hegemon of 
the Eurasian pole. Another reason for the rapid establishment can be found in the Russian annexation 
of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. The annexation led to Russia being struck by Western sanctions, 
reducing its economic strength, and resulted in other prospect members becoming warier of Russia. 
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Naturally, Putin sought to quickly establish the Union to ensure others would join before Russia lost 
all of its economic credibility. The reactions of Belarus and Kazakhstan on the annexation are 
discussed in their respective subchapters.  
Counterarguments supporting the claim of the EaEU being an economic initiative lose their 
credibility when looking at the possible gains for Russia. Indicators for serious economic 
developments were neither present at the time of the announcement of the EaEU, nor are they present 
now. Lining up the available information results in the following conclusion regarding Putin and his 
preferences for establishing the EaEU: Putin seeks to present his country as a great power, notices 
increased influence of other actors within regions he considers to be privileged spheres of interest, and 
counteracts by promoting the swift establishment of a Eurasian Union without any concrete economic 
benefits. Based on these statements, this thesis induces that national preferences for Russia are indeed 
based on the wishes of Vladimir Putin to consolidate and maintain Russian regional hegemony.  
BELARUS 
Contrary to Russia’s keenness on positioning itself as a global power vis-à-vis the ‘West’ and 
China, Belarus has a history which shows are more balanced approach to foreign relations. Belarus is 
often depicted as a close ally of Russia, and the two countries already established a Union State 
together in 2000. Belarus has furthermore been involved in each Russian-led attempt to integrate the 
region since the fall of the Soviet Union. In the late 1990s Lukashenka followed Russia in its 
geopolitical quest to oppose the west, claiming his country would become a bulwark against the West, 
and “…the Union of Belarus and Russia should become an actual counterweight to the unipolar world 
that has developed” (Lukashenka 1999). Despite these seemingly brotherly relations, Belarus is very 
much its own independent state and the relations with Russia have been through various ups and 
downs due to economic and political disputes (Wierzbowska-Miazga 2013). Belarus and Russia have 
frequently clashed over issues such as gas prices, for example in 2007 and 2010, and in recent years 
Lukashenka even accused Russia of launching a “black PR campaign” to discredit him as president 
(Nice 2012). Despite rising tensions, the countries continue to cooperate closely, and Belarus decided 
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to participate in the EaEU project. His reasons to do so however, are considerably different from 
Putin’s.  
It is important to note that foreign policies of Belarus were never as focused on geopolitical 
strength as those of its Russian neighbour. Instead, Lukashenka has become efficient in following a 
delicate balancing strategy throughout the years. Although being described as the closest ally of 
Russia, Lukashenka has been actively exploiting competition between Russia and the EU to gain 
subsidies from both sides and sustain his regime (Nice 2012: 1). Lukashenka is all but secretive about 
his policies, and even noted during a 2008 speech that: “…Belarus’ foreign strategy is based on three 
fundamental principles: political sovereignty, economic openness and equal partner relations with 
other countries. The ‘Golden Rule’ of our foreign policy is multi-vectoredness…,” (Lukashenka 
2008). Despite being an EaEU member Belarus has not abandoned its participation in the EaP, and 
contemporary attempts to reconcile with the EU while still cooperating with Russia show that 
Lukashenka continues to follow his balancing strategy. The balancing strategy followed by Belarus is 
not so much geopolitical in nature, but rather aimed at extracting substantial economic gains from 
different sides.   
While Belarus attempts to balance its relations, the country is mostly reliant on Russia and its 
economy. This dependency on Russia largely stems from the energy sector. In the end of 2015, a 
published note in Belarus indicated that approximately ninety per cent of Belarusian energy imports 
came from Russia, and Russian gas accounted for ninety per cent of heat and energy production in 
Belarus (Smok 2016). This dependence puts Lukashenka in a precarious position, as the fate of the 
Belarusian economy is mostly determined by the success of its Russian counterpart. The fragile 
economy of Belarus also greatly benefits from Russian subsidies, which counterbalance Western 
sanctions and aid Lukashenka in maintaining power (Ambrosio 2006: 420). Essentially, Lukashenka’s 
allegiance can be bought, and Russia is the highest bidder. Economic motivations rather than 
geopolitical ones were crucial for Lukashenka’s choice to join the EaEU. A possible reason to show 
interest in the project is the mentioned 2011 crisis. Russia had denied Belarus an awaited loan worth 
one billion USD in June (Dudko 2011), so it is not unthinkable that Lukashenka agreed to join the 
project announced by Putin in October of the same year to ensure he would receive economic support. 
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Moreover, an integration project such as the EaEU revived hopes of receiving stable supplies of 
resources against competitive prices, and acquiring more loans on preferential terms from Russia 
(Astapenia 2015). Additionally, Lukashenka attempts to use the creation of a common energy market 
to his advantage by arguing a common electricity market can only be achieved if gas prices for 
national enterprises are standardised (Pastukhova & Westphal 2016). 
Lukashenka clearly has neither the wish nor the resources to present his country as a 
geopolitical stronghold, and his willingness to participate in the EaEU stems from the prospect of 
substantial economic support. There is, however, a geopolitical aspect that can be found in Belarus’ 
participation in the project. An important event contributing to geopolitics in Belarus was the Russian 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine in 2014. The annexation caused a sudden turn in 
Lukashenka’s attitude towards Russia; he refused to officially recognise Crimea as a part of Russia, 
and started to mend ties with the EU (Soldatkin & Makhovsky 2016). The events in Ukraine caused 
concern regarding the future of Belarus as an independent state, and raised fear for a possible breach 
of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity (van der Togt 2017: 2). Contrastingly, the 
annexation allowed Lukashenka to make amends with the EU, which considers Belarusian sovereignty 
as a crucial factor to counter Russian influence in the region (Nice 2012: 9). While useful for his 
balancing act, Lukashenka recognised the dependency of his country on Russia and was prepared to 
accept at least some degree of limiting sovereignty (Frear 2013) by still joining the EaEU.  
Pivoting to the EU too much would bring serious implications for Lukashenka. Firstly, 
increased involvement with the EU could result in further pressure to democratise, which is not 
beneficial for Lukashenka’s position. Secondly, Belarus risks both economic and political sanctions by 
Russia, which would have detrimental effects on the economy and overall stability of the country. 
Therefore, it can be stated that Lukashenka initially chose to participate in the EaEU due to the 
possible economic benefits, but later to safeguard his own position as well. By showing willingness to 
cooperate, Lukashenka reduced the chances of provoking Putin into a ‘Crimea 2.0’, as the Treaty on 
the EaEU states the organisation must “respect the principles of sovereign equality of the member 
states and their territorial integrity” (Treaty on the EaEU 2015). Violating territorial integrity of other 
members discredits the EaEU as an organisation, thus joining it was Lukashenka’s safest bet on 
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protecting his position. Therefore, this thesis suggests that Lukashenka’s willingness to join the EaEU 
was initially based on the prospect of economic grants, loans and benefits, but adopted geopolitical 
aspects due to the events in Ukraine.  
KAZAKHSTAN 
 Kazakhstan, much like Belarus, aims at following a multi-vectored strategy. As the largest 
state in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has an important geopolitical position in the region. Its position 
supports the balancing of both economic and geopolitical interests of various regional powers, and has 
allowed Nazarbayev to diversify the economic and transport linkages of his country towards the north, 
south-east and south-west (Patnaik 2016). Kazakhstan is focused on economic ideologies with only 
marginal interference of geopolitical pressure. Nurgaliyeva (2016) rightfully notes that initial foreign 
policy of Kazakhstan was mostly based on geopolitics, but the discourse has changed to economic-
oriented policies. In his work Nicu Popescu (2014: 21) notes that Kazakhstan does not harbour 
geopolitical ambitions like its Russian neighbour, and in fact wishes to avoid a geopolitical battle 
between Russia and the West. This is further supported by Baev (2014: 48), who believes Nazarbayev 
understands the negative consequences of Central Asia disengaging from the West, and therefore 
wishes for better relations between the West and Russia to increase profits. Furthermore, whereas 
Russia sees China as a threat, Kazakhstan sees potential to cooperate. Deepened cooperation with 
China would aid reaching Nazarbayev’s goal of multi-vectoredness, and position Kazakhstan as an 
economic bridge between East and West. To achieve this though, Nazarbayev must cooperate with 
Russia too, otherwise China could gain too much ground in the region. Thus, in terms of goals and 
policies, Kazakhstan is somewhat comparable to Belarus.  
Like Belarus, Kazakhstan’s economy shares intrinsic links with the Russian economy. This 
has led to Nazarbayev being a proponent of integration, or at least closer ties with Russia since the 
early nineties (Henderson 2000: 492), to improve economic linkages and increase economic gains. 
Nazarbayev has always supported the notion of Eurasian integration, and has shown serious political 
commitment towards the integration process. The willingness of Nazarbayev to join the EaEU is 
therefore not necessarily linked to any major geopolitical or economic event; he simply had the wish 
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to integrate. He never shied from stressing that any form of integration should be purely based on 
economic motivations, however (Satpaev 2015). It was through the combined efforts of Lukashenka 
and Nazarbayev that the organisation was named the Eurasian Economic Union, opposing Russia’s 
proposition of a full-fledged Eurasian Union (Dragneva 2016: 6), which was to follow the example of 
the EU more closely by adding a degree of political integration. The focus on economics further shines 
through Nazarbayev’s ‘Kazakhstan 2050’ program, which he announced in 2012. This program aims 
to improve the overall economic situation through economic, social and political reforms in 
Kazakhstan, and ambitiously seeks to place the country among the top thirty global economies by 
2050. It is safe to say that Nazarbayev signing up for the EaEU is the result of his wish to increase 
economic prosperity through integration.  
Nazarbayev’s economic dreams were rudely disrupted by the events in Ukraine, forcing a 
more geopolitically-oriented stance upon him. Nazarbayev always had some degree of geopolitical 
awareness, as even in his early speeches regarding renewed integration in the region he underlined the 
importance of sovereignty and equality (Kudaibergenova 2016). The incidents in Ukraine caused him 
to adopt a more protective stance however, and he started to voice concerns regarding the integration 
project, like Lukashenka had begun to do (Jarosiewicz & Fischer 2015). The anti-Russian sanctions by 
the West were a concern to Nazarbayev, as they caused spill-over damage from the Russian economy 
to Kazakhstan due to their economic interconnectedness (Daly 2014: 96). Moreover, Nazarbayev and 
Lukashenka attempted to avoid politicising the Union by not suspending Ukraine from trade 
agreements made in the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA), which 
Russia unilaterally did by presidential decree (Wolczuk 2016: 15). Other concerns came from 
Kazakhstan’s northern regions where many Russians live, and threats of separatism that may arise 
there. Merely three weeks after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, Kazakhstan introduced a 
new legislation criminalising support for separatism (Popescu 2014: 34), indicating salient perceptions 
of possible threats. Nazarbayev further resorted to more drastic narratives, claiming Kazakhstan would 
retreat from the Union should its sovereignty be infringed (Satubaldina 2014).  
In Kazakhstan, there is ultimately a similar situation as in Belarus. Nazarbayev’s preferences 
that led him to join the Eurasian integration project were based on the ideas of increasing economic 
 
36 
prosperity and strengthening economic links. Eurasian integration was meant as a tool to fulfil 
Nazarbayev’s wishes of becoming an economically strong country, yet recent actions by Russia 
brought geopolitics back in the picture. This caused Nazarbayev’s attitude to become more critical, 
and he continues to stress the project is, and only should be economic in nature. He has further 
expressed increased concerns on maintaining national sovereignty. 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL PREFERENCES 
This chapter has analysed events and individuals that were likely responsible for the formation 
of national preferences, and how these national preferences translated into willingness to join the 
EaEU. In terms of timing, most significant events leading to the announcement and formation of the 
EaEU were geopolitical shifts, while economically only one major economic event could have led to 
the instigation of the project. Major events include the increased presence of other actors in the region, 
notably the EU and China, as well as the pressure to democratise in the globalising international 
system. The domestic actors determining whether integration is taking place or not are the presidents 
of each respective state. Despite being surrounded by powerful individuals, these are ultimately 
subordinated to the wishes of their presidents, and have no final say in the progression of integration. 
If anything, the people surrounding the presidents are tools and advisors who ensure presidential 
wishes are implemented. By using the liberal intergovernmentalist approach, this chapter has indicated 
who are responsible for the national preferences in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which answers an 
important part of the question as to why the countries decided to join the integration process.  
This chapter has further shown that the national preferences of the founding member states 
diverge in nature. Belarus and Kazakhstan joined the project under the presumption it would bring 
them economic benefits. Belarus sought to gain Russia’s favour by participating to extract more 
subsidies, as well as to create a common energy market through the framework of the EaEU. 
Kazakhstan also proposed deepening of economic ties only, and cooperates with Belarus to maintain 
the economic nature of the organisation. Russia on the other hand has clearly shown signs of deeply 
rooted geopolitical ambitions. The announcement of a possible Eurasian Union followed a series of 
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geopolitical shifts, and combined with Russia’s geopolitical ambitions this explains why the project 
suddenly gained momentum. This does not necessarily mean the Union itself is geopolitical in nature, 
however. Being the initiator and largest member, Russia has managed to geopolitically influence the 
Union, yet two of the other founding members insist it is economic and try to protect the Union from 
politicisation. Therefore, this thesis considers the EaEU to be an economic project hijacked by 
geopolitical ambitions of one member.  
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CHAPTER 4: INTERSTATE BARGAINING - MORE THAN YOU 
BARGAINED FOR 
 This chapter follows the second step of the liberal intergovernmentalist framework, interstate 
bargaining, to analyse the relative bargaining positions of each of the founding member states of the 
EaEU. To determine the strength of a country’s bargaining position, this chapter follows several steps. 
First, the asymmetrical interdependence between the founding members is analysed, to determine how 
much influence they have over one another. Secondly, the demands voiced and concessions made by 
the determinants of national preferences are discussed, and whether their demands were met. This 
allows the determination of bargaining efficiency and the distribution of gains, which indicates the 
bargaining strength per member. Third, the possibilities for unilateral and coalitional alternatives for 
each founding member are analysed. The combination of asymmetrical interdependence, bargaining 
strength and alternatives allows the identification of the relative bargaining positions of each of the 
founding members, and what they wish to extract from their participation in the Union.  
INTEGRATION THROUGH ASYMMETRY 
 There are several clear differences between the participating nations of the EaEU in terms of 
economic strength, military strength, size, and political influence. These differences have contributed 
to the discussion of the EaEU being mostly driven by Russian ambitions and the lack of equality 
within the Union. Russia surpasses all other member states in terms of economic, political and military 
influence, and without Russian input the project would not even exist. The asymmetry between 
member states of the EaEU can be derived from Russia’s sheer size alone, which is far bigger than the 
other four members combined. Furthermore, Russian funds are the main driving force of the EaEU. 
This is proven by a document released in 2014 regarding the approved budget of the EaEU for the year 
2015. The document showed Belarus would account for merely 4.7 per cent of the budget, Kazakhstan 
for 7.33 per cent, while Russia contributed for 87.97 per cent of the total budget (Supreme Eurasian 
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Economic Council 2014). Further documents on the budget of the EaEU have not yet been released, 
but it is safe to say such humongous differences are not remedied in a few years. 
When looking at military capacity, Russia is once again the strongest member of the EaEU. 
Russia has further consolidated its military influence through the CSTO. Each member of the EaEU is 
also participating in this organisation. While the actual effectiveness of the CSTO is different topic for 
discussion, it surely gives Russia possibilities to exert its influence on others in two ways. Firstly, the 
CSTO allows Russia to veto the establishment of foreign military bases in other CSTO members, 
making it near impossible to cooperate with other security initiatives. Secondly, the CSTO Rapid 
Reaction Force Mandate allows Russia to intervene in case of internal instability within members of 
the organisation (Grigoryan 2014: 100). There is no clear specification of when a situation is 
‘instable’, giving members certain freedoms in applying the mandate.  
Russia is aware of the difference in power of the EaEU members, and has not shied from 
underlining this difference by using a variety of methods. Throughout the years, Russia has become 
somewhat notorious for using coercive and manipulative tactics to achieve its goals (Obydenkova & 
Libman 2016; van der Togt, Montesano & Kozak 2015; Starr and Cornell 2014). Especially in the 
energy sector Russia has remarkable influence over its neighbours due to their dependence on Russian 
natural resources (Wolczuk 2016). This dependence is exploited by Russia in several ways, for 
example altering gas prices between customers without logical commercial explanation (Forsberg & 
Haukkala 2016: 105), and by banning specific products of others due to sudden issues with their 
quality, for example Belarusian dairy in 2009. Belarus and Kazakhstan have both been affected by 
such measures, occasionally responding with countersanctions and bans, yet their economic influence 
on Russia is not nearly as great as the influence Russia has on them.  
Although Kazakhstan and Belarus are economically more reliant on Russia than vice versa, 
there are several indicators that Russia is in fact also dependent on Belarus and Kazakhstan in certain 
ways. First and foremost, Russia needs Belarus and Kazakhstan as allies in the Eurasian integration 
process, as without their participation the EaEU would lose its credibility as an organisation. The 
withdrawal of Kazakhstan would mean losing the largest state in Central Asia, reducing the Union to 
Russia accompanied by Belarus and parasitical Central Asian states. Belarus is important because it 
 
40 
plays a key role in the Russian plan to solidify the Russkii Mir (Shendrikova 2015: 15), which was 
mentioned in chapter three. Ukraine was the third party of the ‘Slavic triangle’ which was supposed to 
be part of this Russian World, but the annexation of Crimea destroyed any chances of Ukraine taking 
part in the initiative. Belarus is thus Russia’s only shot at consolidating their idea of the Russkii Mir. 
Furthermore, if Belarus and Kazakhstan were to distance themselves further from Russia, it would 
have detrimental effects on Russia’s influence in the region. This shows that relations between Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus are not based on one-sided economic dependence, but rather on 
interdependence based on economic, political and ideological foundations.  
EFFECIENCY AND DISTRIBUTION 
RUSSIA 
The asymmetrical interdependence found within the EaEU results in fluctuating bargaining 
strength for its founding members. At a first glance Russia’s position within the Union seems vastly 
superior compared to its peers, but the complexity of the relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan 
required Russia to make concessions on multiple occasions. The earliest concession made by Putin 
was related to the name of the organisation. As mentioned, Putin initially proposed a full-fledged 
union with both economic and political elements, and has attempted to convince his colleagues this 
was the better option for integration. Putin argued a Eurasian Parliament would be a useful addition, 
but both Kazakhstan and Belarus disagreed with this notion out of fear for politicisation (Michel 
2014). Putin thus had to concede and settle with the current EaEU. Of course, this is a minor 
concession, as changing the name does not automatically mean there are no political elements to be 
found in the EaEU, but it is a concession nonetheless. Additionally, Russia has spent significant sums 
of money on countries joining the EaEU to ensure the transition of becoming an EaEU member would 
proceed smoothly. Russia provided these loans through its own efforts, but also through the Russian-
dominated Eurasian Development Bank (Jarosiewicz & Fischer 2015).  
Another concession made by Russia was the agreement to make changes in the voting system 
of the EEC. Decisions made in the EEC were originally based on a system of weighted voting, in 
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which Russia had fifty per cent of the votes, and Belarus and Kazakhstan each held twenty-five per 
cent of the votes. This meant that the system disallowed Russia to impose its will on the other two 
members, but decisions could not be taken without Russia either. In the new system of the EEC, the 
decision-making was changed to unanimity voting, thus giving each individual member the power to 
veto any decision in the EEC (Popescu 2014: 11). These alterations considerably limited Russia’s 
influence on the decision-making process, in which it previously held a monopoly position. Regardless 
of this ‘sacrifice’ of influence, Belarus and Kazakhstan have repeatedly complained about Russia 
abusing its dominant position in the region (Pastukhova & Westphal 2016: 2). This casts doubt on 
whether the change of systems had any real effects, or if it simply gave Lukashenka and Nazarbayev 
the opportunity to say “no,” only to be ignored or pressured into agreeing with Putin later.  
Due to its economic strength Russia could make considerable demands regarding certain 
economic aspects of the Union, and so it did. During negotiations, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed 
with Russia’s proposition to adopt a common external tariff equal to the national external tariff of 
Russia. Aside from the fact that Russia did not have to make any significant changes to its tariffs, the 
acceptance of the common external tariff had beneficial effects for the country. The tariff resulted in 
what critics dubbed a ‘tariff umbrella’, which allowed Russia to expel European goods from markets 
of other members and replace them with Russian ones (Kirkham 2015). The new tariff regulation thus 
provided Russian producers with new opportunities to sell their products, which positively affected 
Russian industry in other member states of the EaEU (Tarr 2016: 18). The acceptance of these tariff 
changes thus contributed to a positive distribution of gains for Russia. On the other hand, the 
formation of the Union cost Russia vast quantities of money in the form of loans and subsidies, which 
equalises or perhaps even surpasses the gains from the external tariff rate.  
When looking at the current situation in the EaEU, it can be stated that Russia has performed 
relatively well in terms of efficiency, but has an uncertain future in terms of distributional gains. The 
efficiency is dictated by the success of a nation to exploit all possible demands during negotiations. 
While Putin had to concede his ideas of a political union, the fact that the EaEU was established is 
already a testimony of his success. Putin actively pushed the notion of integration forward; the EaEU 
is very much his personal project. Its establishment alone is already a sign of great efficiency in 
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negotiations, as others were apparently convinced it was a good idea. Moreover, Russia managed to 
exploit economic opportunities by adopting a common external tariff equal to its own. Not only is this 
a sign of efficiency, it also shows Russia managed to receive distributional gains from the 
negotiations. These gains are somewhat mitigated by Russia’s willingness to ‘buy’ memberships for 
the EaEU however, and the degrading Russian economy may result in these memberships turning into 
liabilities in the future. Still, the formation of the EaEU gave Putin opportunities for renewed influence 
in the post-Soviet region, meaning that economic gains may be lacking, but (geo) political gains were 
certainly made.  
BELARUS  
 Lukashenka is not unfamiliar with exploiting Russia, and negotiations for joining the EaEU 
clearly showed his cunningness. Due to the loss of Ukraine as a prospect member, Russia was more 
than willing to make concessions, and Lukashenka sought to use this to his full advantage. 
Considering Belarus’ dependence on the Russian energy sector, it comes as no surprise that most of 
Lukashenka’s demands were energy-related. During negotiations, Lukashenka made it clear that the 
participation of Belarus in the EaEU project would depend on the abolition of duties on exported oil 
products created with Russian crude oil (Pastukhova & Westphal 2016: 4). Creating a common energy 
market is also high on the list for Belarus, as it allows for more competitiveness and reduces the risk of 
fluctuating prices of energy resources. The demands made by Lukashenka were certainly heard, and 
declarations for the creation of a common electricity market and a common oil and gas market were 
made early in the negotiating process. Disappointingly, the creation of a common electricity market 
and common oil and gas market are postponed until 2019 and 2025 respectively; this is mainly due to 
reluctance of other members to integrate such strategically important sectors (Jarosiewicz & Fischer 
2015). Nevertheless, the issue of common energy markets is on the agenda, which could be considered 
a victory for Lukashenka. In addition, Lukashenka has managed to extract subsidies from Russia with 
an approximate value of ten billion USD through cheap supplies of oil and gas (Åslund 2016).  
Other demands made by Lukashenka revolved around the issue of member states being equal. 
This issue was addressed by adopting the ‘one country, one vote’ system in the EEC, which – at least 
 
43 
on paper – gives Belarus an equal voice in the Union. Furthermore, by joining the EaEU Belarus 
gained the option to undertake legal action against other members through the judicial body of the 
organisation. The Treaty on the EaEU states court decisions are binding, meaning Belarus could bind 
Russia through decisions of the Court (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2015: 12). While it sounds nice in 
theory, the first chapter of this thesis already touched upon the fact that Court decisions are often seen 
as recommendations rather than binding rulings. Additionally, members of the SC can overrule Court 
decisions as well. This means that in practice, Putin could overrule decisions made by the Court, and 
ultimately resort to personal negotiations with Lukashenka to resolve the issue. Still, Lukashenka has 
managed to keep up the idea of equality by countering any opportunity threatening to plunge Belarus 
into unfavourable contractual obligations (Korosteleva 2016: 3), and reminded Putin of Belarus’ 
importance by no-showing at the 2016 heads of state meeting. By doing so, Lukashenka blocked the 
confirmation of a Customs Code document (Kłysiński 2017).  
While seemingly successful in the negotiations, Lukashenka has not achieved much in terms 
of efficiency. Lukashenka demanded common energy markets in the EaEU, yet was given vague 
statements on the formation of common markets in 2019 and 2025. Whether this will happen is 
another question, so Lukashenka ultimately left empty-handed. He did, on the other hand, manage to 
extract hefty subsidies, which provided him with short term positive distributional gains. Long term 
distributional gains remain largely dependent on Russia though. The opportunity to veto Russia’s 
decisions and block documents that Lukashenka disagrees with are a sign of positive gains in terms of 
political power, but complaints of Russian dominance in the region indicate this power has limitations.  
KAZAKHSTAN   
Out of all three founding members Kazakhstan arguably had the least amount of demands, but 
made serious concessions. The reason for this to happen can perhaps be explained by looking at 
Nazarbayev’s support for regional integration, and his wish to position Kazakhstan as a Eurasian state. 
The demands that Nazarbayev did make were that the establishment of any union had to be purely 
economic in nature. In some perspectives, Nazarbayev was successful during negotiations, as issues 
such as common foreign policies, common citizenship, and inter-parliamentary cooperation were 
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scrapped from the Treaty on the EaEU on behalf of Kazakhstan’s request (Garcés de los Fayos 2014: 
6), and at the expense of Putin’s political Union. Then again, fear of politicisation of the EaEU 
remains a hot topic for both Belarus and Kazakhstan, showing that the issue is not yet entirely 
resolved. Furthermore, both Nazarbayev and Lukashenka were initially against the joining of 
Kyrgyzstan into the Union, as it was feared that Kyrgyzstan would be able to strengthen its position as 
a Chinese re-exporter (Strzelecki 2016). Their failure to block Kyrgyzstan from joining the Union 
indicates the weakness of the demands made by Kazakhstan and Belarus opposed to Russia.  
When looking at the distribution of gains Kazakhstan did not do well. Kazakhstan was forced 
to raise half of its tariffs from a rate of 6.5 per cent to 12.1 per cent to comply with the new EaEU 
standards (Dreyer & Popescu 2014: 1). The increase in tariffs adversely affected Kazakhstan’s 
business environment while increasing prospects for Russian producers (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2015). 
Bordachev (2015) claimed that Kazakhstan was in fact benefitting the most of the EaEU, but 
economic analyses contradict this statement. In an analytical report by Tarr (2016: 17) it is shown that 
the Kazakh economy suffered from the new tariff regulations, and Nazarbayev’s hopes to compensate 
these losses through the reduction of nontariff barriers were dismantled due to slow progress in this 
area. Another economic report by Kubayeva (2015) argues that in the first three years of the Customs 
Union it was Kazakhstan that benefitted the least of the new tariff regulations. Additionally, due to 
Kazakhstan having an economy highly dependent on natural resources such as oil, it did not receive 
subsidies from Russia as goodwill for joining the EaEU (Tarr 2016: 17), unlike Belarus. Overall, 
Kazakhstan has thus achieved little in terms of short-term and long-term gains.  
At first sight Nazarbayev has seemingly proven to be efficient during negotiations to some 
extent by blocking Putin’s attempts to politicise the Union. On the other hand, complaints of Russian 
abusing its position and the failure to block Kyrgyzstan’s accession indicate Russian political 
influence still dominates in the Union. This undermines Nazarbayev’s attempts to counter 
politicisation, thus showing he has not been efficient at all. Out of all three founders Kazakhstan has 
profited the least, showing Nazarbayev failed to exploit negotiations to receive distributional gains. 
The timid attitude of Nazarbayev during negotiations could be accredited to his wish of integration 
finally being fulfilled, which caused him to not make too many demands besides the Union being 
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economic. Another possibility is that initial prospects of economic gains were higher, but afterwards 
disrupted by the conflict in Ukraine and the economic sanctions on Russia that followed. In terms of 
efficiency and gains, Kazakhstan’s performance was the least effective of all founding members.  
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS: UNILATERAL AND COALITIONAL  
 The final factor determining the relative bargaining positions is the option to establish 
alternatives. In terms of alternatives, both unilateral and coalitional, Belarus is in the most vulnerable 
position of the three founding fathers. Despite Lukashenka’s efforts to exploit the strongest possible 
position for his country, the interconnectedness with Russia discredits these attempts. It must be 
acknowledged that Lukashenka managed to sustain his balancing act, and showed Putin his influence 
on Belarus has limitations. Despite this, Belarus is currently facing increasingly negative terms of 
trade due to worsening relations and decreasing demands from the Russian market (van der Togt 2017: 
7). Moreover, Lukashenka has been careful with taking criticism on the EaEU too far, lest he trigger 
events like Crimea (Kłysiński 2017). This reflects the true position of Lukashenka; a position based on 
cautious bluffing and questionable threats. The dependence on the Russian economy makes it difficult 
for Belarus to pursue any credible unilateral alternatives. Unilateral alternatives are strengthened by 
the right to veto, which Belarus has in the EaEU, but this is likely to result in a stalemate between 
members as Belarus has no viable alternatives to adopt.   
 Lukashenka has voiced threats of Belarus leaving the EaEU, but doing so could bring 
detrimental effects for Belarus. Firstly, Lukashenka could risk economic sanctions, political pressure 
and military interventions from Russia if he chooses to distance himself from the Union. Secondly, 
article 18 section 2 of the Treaty on the EaEU notes that member states withdrawing from the Union 
are obliged to fulfil their financial obligations to the Union, even after withdrawal (Treaty on the 
EaEU 2015: 136). This means that Russia could demand reimbursement for all the loans and subsidies 
it has provided for Belarus’ accession into the EaEU, something that Lukashenka can hardly afford. 
Such demands could perhaps be avoided if the EaEU were to collapse on its own, but withdrawing 
from the Union unilaterally is too dangerous for Lukashenka at this moment.  
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 In terms of coalitional alternatives, the most logical option for Belarus is to cooperate with 
other members within the EaEU. The possibility to do so is undermined by the exorbitant difference in 
economic, geographical and military power however. This makes it near-impossible to form 
alternative coalitions in the Union that could effectively exert influence over Russia. Cooperation 
between Belarus and Kazakhstan to block politicisation can hardly be considered as a sign of possible 
coalitional alternatives. These efforts were merely coalitional countermeasures against Putin’s plans to 
change the name, but this did not provide any alternatives for further integration, nor did it exclude 
Russia from negotiations. Relations between Belarus and Kazakhstan are furthermore not strong 
enough to create a threat to Russian dominance. A 2015 census shows that only two per cent of 
Belarusian exports went to Kazakhstan, and merely 0.15 per cent of Belarusian imports came from 
Kazakhstan (Global Edge 2017). Forming a coalition would carry little to no economic weight against 
Russia. The EU is a possible external alternative for Belarus, but this is not realistic. Relations with the 
EU remain underdeveloped compared to Russo-Belarusian relations, and it would take many years for 
Lukashenka to reduce its dependency on Russia to such an extent that the EU would become a viable 
alternative. The same goes for China, which could prove to be a solid trading partner for Belarus, but 
would take years to efficiently replace Russia.  
 Kazakhstan did a better job than Belarus in creating alternatives to reduce its dependence on 
Russia. Nazarbayev has successfully diversified the oil trade routes of his country, which allowed him 
to circumvent Russian pipelines when possible. Examples include Kazakhstan’s support of the BTC 
pipeline project, which goes westwards from Azerbaijan to Turkey. Partaking in such a project would 
provide Kazakhstan with new possibilities and markets for exporting oil. China is an interesting export 
market for Kazakhstan as well, and the two are already collaborating on pipelines bypassing Russia 
(Nurgaliyeva 2016). If negotiations in the EaEU regarding the harmonisation of the oil sectors are not 
concluded, or end up being unfavourable by 2025, Kazakhstan could unilaterally decide to pursue 
better conditions to both the West and East. Pursuing a coalition with China could be risky for 
Kazakhstan though, as too much Chinese influence would reduce Kazakhstan from a bridge between 
East and West to a transit state for Chinese products. Another option for Kazakhstan is to leave the 
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EaEU and focus on its membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) instead, but would then 
also risk demands of EaEU members to fulfil previously-made agreements.  
 In Russia’s case, it is not the question whether it has unilateral or coalitional alternatives at its 
disposal – because it clearly does – but it is the question whether it should pursue those alternatives. 
Putin’s wish was to establish a new bloc, and as shown he made several concessions to achieve that. If 
Russia, the driving force of integration was to follow unilateral alternatives circumventing the Union, 
it would tarnish the credibility of the EaEU. This has occurred before with Russia’s unilateral 
exclusion of Ukraine from the CISFTA, which required the EEC to jump in to save face (Bolgova 
2016). Such occurrences undermine the effectiveness of the Union and discredit statements that the 
EaEU is a well-functioning economic entity. Since Russia contributed the biggest amount of money 
and loans to the Union and its member states, and most economic policies of the Union are based on 
Russian ones, article 118, paragraph two of the Treaty would be of little concern. Russia is thus free to 
leave the Union and attempt to pursue closer cooperation with for example the EU or members of the 
BRICS2, but then all Putin’s work would be for nothing.  
  PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: INTERSTATE BARGAINING 
 The goal of this chapter was to discuss the relative bargaining positions of the three founding 
member states based on asymmetrical interdependence, efficiency and distribution of gains and 
unilateral and coalitional alternatives. When looking at asymmetrical interdependence both Belarus 
and Kazakhstan are economically dependent on Russia. Contrastingly, before the official 
establishment of the Union Russia was dependent on the memberships of Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
because without their allegiance any chance of the EaEU being established was lost. Now that the 
EaEU is established this dependence is reversed, and article 118 makes it difficult for members to 
leave without facing economic repercussions. The establishment of the Union is by itself a testimony 
of Putin’s success in the negotiations, and concessions made such as changing the name of the Union 
are of minor importance. Financial support for other members is but a small sacrifice compared to 
                                                             
2 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South-Africa; a term institutionalised by Putin which included rising 
economies. 
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Russia’s distributional gains, especially in terms of political influence. Through the establishment of 
the Union Russia gained more political influence in the region, as well as economic influence through 
the common external tariff and loans.  
 Nazarbayev failed to exploit negotiations to their fullest, which can be derived from a lack of 
demands made and the distributional losses rather than gains. The only demand adhered to was the de-
politicisation of the Union by removing certain elements, but this has ultimately not resulted in the 
disappearance of political pressure in the Union. The adoption of the common tariff and failed 
reduction of nontariff barriers caused severe losses for the Kazakh economy, indicating that 
Kazakhstan has arguably been the least effective member in terms of distributional gains. The relative 
bargaining position of Kazakhstan is at least strengthened by its geopolitical location and 
diversification, which gives the country options for unilateral and coalitional alternatives. These 
alternatives save Kazakhstan from having the weakest relative position.  
 Even though Lukashenka adopted a tough stance during negotiations, and managed to secure 
some short-term gains, his efficiency is low. Demands made by Lukashenka regarding the energy 
sectors have all been postponed until later years, so effectively Belarus did not truly manage to exploit 
its seemingly strong bargaining position. Short-term distributional gains were made in the form of 
loans and subsidies, yet these could prove to be a tool of Russian leverage if Belarus were to make the 
wrong choices regarding its membership in the Union. If anything, Belarus’ membership in the EaEU 
has only increased its already high dependency on Russia. Belarus’ relative bargaining position is 
lowered further due to the absence of realistic alternatives, both unilateral and coalitional. Shortly 
summarised, when looking at relative bargaining positions it can be stated that Russia is the strongest 
member, Kazakhstan comes second, and Belarus is the weakest.   
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CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of this thesis was to show how liberal intergovernmentalism can help 
explain why the founding members of the EaEU established the organisation. Through the analysis of 
national preference formation and interstate bargaining, this thesis has shown that the liberal 
intergovernmentalist theoretical framework can help clarifying as to why Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus formed the Union. First, this thesis has shown that the national preferences of the founding 
members differ from one another, with one member basing its preferences on geopolitical motives, 
and two members basing their preferences on economic motives. These formations are dictated by 
national leaders accompanied by marginal influence of elite groupings. The interstate bargaining 
shows on what basis the leaders decided to agree to establish the Union.  
Putin’s national preferences can indeed be considered geopolitical when analysing major 
events during the time of the EaEU’s conception, as well as Russian foreign policy. Besides the 
economic crisis of 2008 no significant economic shifts took place, whereas multiple geopolitical 
events occurred around the time plans for an integration project were announced, and also shortly 
before the time of its establishment. By presenting the Union as an alternative to the EU, Putin created 
a bulwark for shielding autocratic states. Concessions made by Putin during the negotiations gave the 
impression that the Union would indeed be purely economic, yet they did not truly reduce Russia’s 
political influence over other members. Economic influence has also been strengthened through the 
adoption of Russian tariffs and providing members with loans and subsidies, which can serve as future 
leverage for Russia. Thus, the main purpose for Putin to establish the Union was to maintain control in 
the region and, when looking at the political and economic influence he retained throughout the 
negotiations, he successfully managed to do so.  
Then national preferences of Lukashenka were mostly aimed at receiving as much economic 
benefits as possible. By joining the Russian-led integration project Lukashenka sought to gain 
preferential trade deals, subsidies and loans from its neighbours, especially since the economic 
situation in Belarus was not looking good at the time. His most prominent wish was for harmonisation 
of energy sectors, which would be preferential for Belarus considering its dependence on Russian gas. 
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Furthermore, by joining an organisation that treated members as equals, Lukashenka tried to reduce 
Russian influence over Belarus. In practice, it did not work out like that. Russia is still the most 
dominant member within the Union despite the Union’s legislative framework. Although Lukashenka 
received a significant sum through subsidies and loans, this is only a short-term effect of joining the 
EaEU. The weakening economic situation in Russia makes chances on such preferential deals less 
likely in the future, and the loans granted by Russia are now dormant tools of leverage. Whether the 
energy sectors will be harmonised is uncertain as well. Lukashenka agreed to establish the EaEU 
under the pretence of economic benefits and equal political power, but instead stranded in a union with 
no real prospects for long-term economic development and harmonisation, nor with political equality 
for its members.  
Nazarbayev long wished for renewed integration in the region, so it is no surprise why he 
decided to agree on joining the project. His goal was to establish a union based on respecting 
sovereignty and economic gains. By joining the Eurasian integration project Nazarbayev hoped to 
position his country as a bridge between East and West, trading with both sides for maximum 
economic potential. His willingness to see the integration process happen caused Nazarbayev to not 
make significant demands regarding the Union, except for the name and nature of the Union to be 
economic. Much like Lukashenka, Nazarbayev’s dreams of a Union based on equality were shattered 
by Russian dominance. Nazarbayev agreed to policies that severely harmed Kazakhstan’s economy 
whilst creating a beneficial environment for Russian producers. The EaEU was supposed to be an 
economic organisation for increasing prosperity in Kazakhstan, but ironically the country was affected 
the worst of all three founding members. In the end only one of the founders truly received what they 
intended, and left the other two stuck in a broken union hijacked by geopolitical ambitions.  
The author is convinced that liberal intergovernmentalism can be used as a baseline theory for 
Eurasian integration, and that this thesis has shown in what ways it can do that. This thesis could serve 
as a stepping stone for new research concerning liberal intergovernmentalism as a theory to analyse 
Eurasian integration. Not only can this thesis add to the discussion of Eurasian integration, but also to 
the discussion concerning the application of liberal intergovernmentalism. As this thesis focused on 
the first two steps of the basic liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical framework, further research 
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could focus on adding additional elements of the theory to reach complementing, or perhaps 
contrasting conclusions regarding the usefulness of liberal intergovernmentalism when analysing other 
regions. Additionally, the scope of this thesis was aimed towards the three founding member states of 
the EaEU. Future research could opt to include the remaining members of the Union, or solely focus 
on these members to reach new results. Furthermore, discussions regarding Eurasia and regional 
integration theories often call for a new theory to be developed. The author of this thesis believes it is 
not necessary to develop an entirely new theory, but an alteration of the existing liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework would be sufficient, once peculiarities of the region in question are 
considered. This hypothesis serves as a suggestion for further research on Eurasian integration through 
the lens of liberal intergovernmentalism. It should be acknowledged that no single theory can cover all 
aspects of regional integration, liberal intergovernmentalism included. Nevertheless, it can be 
considered as a useful baseline theory for any type of research regarding regional integration, and 
should receive more attention than it currently does.  
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